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Abstract This study provides new evidence on the outcomes of auctions
of residential real estate, focusing on the effects of bidder
turnout, pricing, market conditions and auction houses. The
analysis of properties offered for sale by auction in Singapore
from 1995 to 2000 shows that several variables are signiﬁcant
in explaining why an auction results in a sale. These variables
include the state of the market, the timing of the auction (year),
the number of bidders and the auction house. The ﬁndings
indicate that the probability of a sale is higher for distress sales,
for more homogenous properties and for those located in the
central region. A sensitivity analysis is provided of how market
conditions and the choice of auction house inﬂuence the
probability of a sale.
Introduction
There is increasing interest in auctions as an alternative to private negotiations for
marketing property. Since Vickrey (1961) opened the issue of whether pricing
mechanisms matter, considerable effort has been put into the question of how
auction revenues would rank under different sets of market expectations and
valuations, and whether auctions and private negotiations can be expected to
produce equal revenues. Reviews are found in McAfee and McMillan (1987) and
Wilson (1992). Kagel (1995) reviews experimental research.
Recent research has focused on comparing revenues from different auction formats
to revenues from private negotiations (Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler, 1998;
Mayer 1998; and Allen and Swisher, 2000). Less attention has been paid to the
question of the determinants of auction success, deﬁning success as a sale being
made. DeBoer, Conrad and McNamara (1992) examine outcomes with a model
limited to location and property-speciﬁc variables. Anglin (2003) and Mayer
(1995) add changes in market conditions and Maher (1989) adds differences in
intermediaries. Anglin provides an excellent theoretical treatment of how price178  Ong, Lusht and Mak
and the probability of sale are related to market conditions. Dotzour, Moorhead
and Winkler compare the probabilities of auction sales versus private sales for
residential properties in Christchurch, New Zealand.
This study extends prior work by estimating a model that includes controls not
only for locational and property characteristics, but also variables that measure
the impact of ‘‘turnout’’—a proxy for the number of bidders at an auction—and
the impact of the auctioning house. Interestingly, though there is a large theoretical
literature on the importance of the number of bidders (Vickey, 1961; Milgrom,
1979; and McAfee and McMillan, 1987), empirical evidence is thin. Burns (1985),
in an experimental setting and counter to expectations, found that fewer bidders
resulted in higher average prices. Saidi and Marsden (1992) found a positive
correlation between average bid size and the number of bidders at auctions for
outer-continental offshore oil leases. More recently, Chen, Liaw and Leung (2003)
show that the number of shares tendered by bidders signiﬁcantly affects the price
of auctioned shares in Taiwan. Work on the effect of bidder turnout at real estate
auctions is limited to Ching and Fu (2003), who measured the impact of
competition on the share prices of companies bidding for land.
Using data from Singapore that includes all auctions of residential property from
1995:Q3 through 2000:Q1, this study ﬁnds that the state of the market (economy),
the timing of the auction, the potential number of bidders and certain auctioning
houses explain the probability of a successful auction. The ﬁndings also suggest
an underlying trend toward more successful auctions, likely attributable to the
increasing acceptance of auctions as a selling mechanism. A marginal effects
analysis is included to obtain a clearer appreciation of how market conditions and
the choice of auction house inﬂuence the probability of a sale.
The dominant auction format in Singapore is the English ascending bid auction.
An auction has generally been regarded as the last resort method of disposal.1 The
local sentiment towards auction is similar to that in the United States, where
auctions are associated with distress properties—foreclosure or mortgagee sales
(Asabere and Huffman, 1992). Distress sales are typically initiated by a mortgagee
(bank/ﬁnancial institution). There was a surge in auction sales following the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of 1998–1999. Although the large majority of auctions remain
mortgagee initiated, in the past few years there has been a discernible increase in
owner auctions due to a diminution of the stigma associated with auctions.
Nonetheless, the number of properties offered at auction is still low, reaching a
high of approximately 3.5% of the total number of property transactions in 1998
and 1999.
The data for this study come from 1,654 residential properties that were offered
at auction from 1995:Q3 through 2000:Q1. The sample includes auctions of
apartments, condominiums, terrace, semi-detached and detached houses (see
Exhibit 1). Transaction data were obtained from the ReaLink database, which is
compiled by the Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (SISV).2 The private
Residential Property Price Indexes (RPI) was obtained from the UrbanFactors Influencing Auction Outcomes  179
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Redevelopment Authority of Singapore (URA). The RPI was used to estimate the
market value of each property at the time of auction.
Auctions that were successfully transacted (positive outcome) and those that were
not (negative outcome) were identiﬁed.3 In Singapore, properties are sometimes
repeatedly offered at auction if prior attempts were unsuccessful. The sample
includes only the most recent auction attempt, regardless of earlier outcomes.
 The Empirical Model
Equation (1) is the empirical model:
OUT  f(LRP, SOM, DATE, LOC, AH, TYPE, VP,
DISTR, TEN, TURN), (1)
where the dependent variable, outcome of the auction (OUT), is given a value of
1 for a successful auction, and a value of 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables
are the level of the reserve price (LRP), the state of the private residential property
market (SOM), the date of auction (vector DATE), the location of the property
(vector LOC), the auctioning houses (vector AH), type (vector TYPE), the tenure
of the property (TEN), property whether with vacant possession (VP), distress sale
(DISTR)4 and the turnout (TURN) at the auction.
Auction theory suggests that a higher reserve price should increase the selling
price, but decrease the probability of sale (McAfee and Vincent, 1992). Supporting
evidence that the reserve price in fact affects the probability of sale is found in
DeBoer, Conrad and McNamara (1992). Efforts to empirically measure the role180  Ong, Lusht and Mak
of the reserve price, including the merits of a hidden reserve price (Riley and
Samuelson, 1981; and Vincent, 1989), and the identiﬁcation of an optimal reserve
price (McAfee and Vincent, 1992; McAfee, Quan and Vincent, 2002; Eklof and
Lunander, 2003; and Li, Perrigne and Vuong, 2003) have been hindered by the
fact that the reserve price is often hidden or undisclosed (Toda, Nozdrina and
Maddala, 1998). The data in the present study is no exception; it does not include
information on the (hidden) reserve prices. A proxy measure is developed called
the level of reserve price (LRP), which is deﬁned as the difference between the
property’s estimated market value and the opening bid, divided by the opening
bid. The estimated market value is the last transaction price for the auctioned
property or the estimated market value of properties most comparable to the
auctioned property if there is no previous transaction, adjusted by the price index
(RPI).5 The adjustment uses the RPI from the quarter prior to the auction, as
information on the contemporaneous price index is not available at the time of
auction.
The motivation for the LRP proxy is that the opening bid provides valuable
information as to the reserve price. The undisclosed reserve price should be higher
than the opening bid (which is determined by the seller and/or auctioneer). By
computing the difference between the market value and the opening bid, the level
of the reserve price is captured relative to the estimated market value or conversely,
relative to the opening bid. This variable thus controls for the effect of reserve
price on the probability of a successful outcome.6
Comparables were used to estimate market value when the data did not include
information on past transaction prices. This occurred for approximately 20% of
the sample. Comparables are transactions of properties similar to the ‘‘subject’’
property with respect to the vector of physical and locational characteristics
typically associated with value. In most instances, comparables were available in
the same general location as the subject property, and the volume of potential
comparables made matching other characteristics relatively straightforward.
In short, the LRP measures the appropriateness of the property’s reserve price
prior to the commencement of the auction. A positive LRP reﬂects an opening
bid that is lower than market value.7 The expected sign of the LRP must be
discovered empirically. Intuitively, the speculation is that the coefﬁcient will be
positive, on the basis that a lower opening bid signals a lower reserve price, which
could encourage bidding.
The state of the market (SOM) indirectly affects the sentiment of property buyers
and hence affects the probability of a sale. Mayer (1995) explores the role that
information and market conditions play in determining the relative performance
of various sales techniques, including auctions. Like Asabere and Huffman (1992),
he also accounts for market sentiments in his analysis of auction performance.
More recently, Anglin (2003) provides a theoretical treatment of how the price/
probability relationship changes in response to changes in market conditions.Factors Influencing Auction Outcomes  181
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SOM is a dummy variable given a value of zero if the auction occurred in a
quarter following two previous successive quarters of negative growth in the RPI.
The use of two successive quarters of RPI growth as a gauge is synonymous with
the economic norm that considers an economy in technical recession with two
successive quarters registering negative growth.8 SOM is given a value of one for
all other patterns of prior RPI growth. The coefﬁcient for SOM is expected to be
positive.
The timing of auctions has been investigated in two ways. First, the effect of
timing as the auction proceeds (Ashenfelter 1989; Ashenfelter and Genesove,
1992; and Lusht, 1994) and second, the effect of time over separate auction
attempts (Asabere and Huffman, 1992; and Vanderporten, 1992). A vector of
DATE dummy variables is created for each year from 1996 through 2000 (D96,
D97, D98, D99 and D00).
Location has previously been associated with auction outcomes. Asabere and
Huffman (1992) investigated the impacts of physical, locational, time and
neighborhood characteristics on the outcomes of auctions of foreclosed properties
and found that location mattered. Deboer, Conrad and McNamara (1992) report
that as many as three-quarters of surveyed bidders in the auction of land parcels
were inﬂuenced by the location of the parcel when bidding. More than half of
those surveyed also cited neighborhood quality as an important consideration.
To capture location effects (LOC), a number of classiﬁcations (prime versus non-
prime, regions, etc) are explored. Results are reported for properties classiﬁed as
being in the central and east regions (DISTCENT and DISTEAST), the default
being all other regions (west, north and northeast). Properties in central locations
(close to city center) are expected to generate greater interest and participation
because they are in limited supply. The east region is also considered a good class
residential area.
There have been no prior attempts to quantify the possible inﬂuence of the
auctioning agent on either the price obtained or the probability of a sale. However,
there is casual evidence that agents play a signiﬁcant role (see Maher, 1989, for
a discussion of auction institutions in Melbourne). This prompts a hypothesis that
auction houses (AH) (agents for sellers in property auctions) may exert a non-
trivial inﬂuence on auction outcomes. The ‘big four’ auction houses9 are identiﬁed
using dummy variables, with all other auction houses the default. Auction house
A has the largest market share, as evidenced in Exhibit 2. Auction house C, though
being the smallest of the ‘big four,’ is well established and has a good reputation.
The expectation is an empirical question.
The tenure (TEN) of the property may also inﬂuence the probability of a sale.
Freehold10 properties are prized possessions in Singapore because all public sales
of land now come with (99-year) leasehold estates rather than freehold estates. A
dummy variable with a value of one is assigned to freehold status, with leaseholds



















Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics and Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Representation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Remarks
Outcome OUT 0.266 0.013 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is sold in auction;  0i f
otherwise.
Level of Reserve Price LRP 0.0935 0.163 0 0.958 Ratio  (IP – OB)/OB.
State of the Private Residential
Market
SOM 0.517 0.015 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if market is not in recession;  0 if market
is in depression
Year Dummies D96 0.070 0.255 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if auction is in that year.
D97 0.032 0.178 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if auction is in that year.
D98 0.272 0.484 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if auction is in that year.
D99 0.469 0.499 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if auction is in that year.
D00 0.009 0.095 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if auction is in that year.
Location of Subject Property DISTCENT 0.225 0.417 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is in central region;  0i f
otherwise.



























































Exhibit 2  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Representation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Remarks
Auction House A A 0.357 0.014 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is handled by this AH;  0i f
otherwise.
Auction House B B 0.319 0.014 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is handled by this AH;  0i f
otherwise.
Auction House C C 0.089 0.008 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is handled by this AH;  0i f
otherwise.
Auction House D D 0.209 0.012 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is handled by this AH;  0i f
otherwise.
Tenure of Subject TEN 0.830 0.011 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if property is freehold;  0 if otherwise.
Number of Turnout TURN 194 2.651 30 450 Number of bidders in attendance.
Terrace House TERR 0.156 0.363 0 1
Semi-Detached House SEMID 0.231 0.422 0 1
Detached House DETACH 0.167 0.313 0 1 Dummy Variable for property type
Distress Sale DISTR .5938 .4913 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if sale from foreclosure
Vacant Possession VP .8993 .3010 0 1 Dummy variable  1 if sale with vacant possession184  Ong, Lusht and Mak
There is a rich theoretical literature that addresses the association between the
number of bidders and the expected price at auction, but with the exception of
Burns (1985), there has been little empirical work. Vickrey (1961) shows that
under a set of strong assumptions,11 as the number of bidders increases, the bid
that each makes in a multi-unit progressive auction bidding model comes closer
to each bidder’s valuation or reserve price. McAcfee and McMillan (1987)
examine auctions with a stochastic number of bidders, where the probability of
observing a certain number of actual bidders depends on the number of potential
bidders. Burns (1985), in an experimental setting, tests the reaction of buyers to
changes in the number of participants in the market. Contrary to standard
expectations, it was found that fewer bidders tend to result in higher prices.
Intuitively, a higher turnout suggests a higher chance of a positive auction
outcome. The number of persons attending the auction, the turnout (TURN), is
used here as a measure of bidder interest. It is recognized that this proxy is subject
to some error as it is not possible to unbundle the number attending into those
that are potential bidders and those who are simply observers. Nonetheless, agents
claim a strong association between turnout and bidding behavior. The coefﬁcient
on TURN is expected to be positive, as higher attendance should be associated
with a higher chance of success.
Other control variables are for property type (terrace, semi-detached and detached
houses, default being high-rise apartments and condominiums), whether a distress
sale or not (DISTR), and whether the property was vacant on the date of the
auction (VP).
 Results and Analysis
The results of the probit estimation of Equation (1) are shown in Exhibit 3. The
model is statistically signiﬁcant and the results indicate that the probability of an
auction sale is likely to improve if the auctioned property is a distress sale, the
market is not in recession, the auctioning house is either A or C, and there is a
relatively high turnout. These results are all consistent with expectations.
Distress properties (DISTR) have a higher chance of being sold, as indicated by
the highly signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient. This is expected as the sellers of
defaulted properties—typically banks and ﬁnancial institutions—have a higher
incentive to attempt to recoup their investments. The ﬂipside are properties put
up for auction by owners. Owner-sellers appear to be less anxious to sell, with
some only testing the market.
The state of the market (SOM) is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, supporting the
expectation that depressed market conditions are associated with dampened
demand. The 1998 year dummy variable is also highly signiﬁcant and negative.
This result is not surprising given the poor market sentiments following the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis. The other year dummy variables are not signiﬁcantly different
from the base year (1995). The model is also re-estimated using an alternativeFactors Influencing Auction Outcomes  185
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Exhibit 3  Results from the Binary Probit Model
Coeff. Std. Error t-Stat. P Value
Constant 2.5162** 0.4393 5.727 0.0000
LRP 0.0104 0.0841 0.123 0.9018
SOM 0.3031*** 0.1562 1.940 0.0524
A 0.5164 0.3912 1.320 0.1869
B 0.1551 0.3931 0.395 0.6931
C 0.7329*** 0.4077 1.798 0.0722
D 0.3779 0.3898 0.969 0.3324
TEN 0.1650 0.1200 1.375 0.1690
TURN 0.0034** 0.0006 5.252 0.0000
DISTR 0.8188** 0.1103 7.421 0.0000
D96 0.0824 0.3069 0.269 0.7883
D97 0.6124 0.4681 1.308 0.1908
D98 0.7068* 0.3085 2.291 0.0220
D99 0.0368 0.2700 0.136 0.8916
D00 0.0547 0.4948 0.110 0.9120
TERR 0.0677 0.1265 0.535 0.5925
SEMID 0.2227*** 0.1208 1.843 0.0653
DETACH 0.6398** 0.1508 4.242 0.0000
VP 0.0286 0.1603 0.178 0.8585
DISTCENT 0.2058*** 0.1155 1.782 0.0747
DISTEAST 0.0858 0.1026 0.836 0.4031
Notes: The nob is 1,154. The log-likelihood function is 553.118.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
date variable (indexed by quarters from 1995:Q3), and the coefﬁcient turns out to
be positive and signiﬁcant. This supports the casually observed trend toward more
frequent use of auction as a marketing mechanism.
The ‘big four’ auction houses do not exert similar effects on auction outcomes.
Auctioning house C has a positive impact on the probability of success, and is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Turnout (TURN) is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This
is the ﬁrst empirical support for theoretical expectations, and is a particularly
important result when coupled with the ﬁndings of prior work that showed a
positive association between turnout and the price of auctioned land (Ching and
Fu, 2003).186  Ong, Lusht and Mak
Exhibit 4  Marginal Effects
Coeff. Std Error t-Stat. P Value
Constant 0.5139 0.0933 5.511 0.0000
LRP 0.0020 0.0174 0.116 0.9077
SOM 0.0625*** 0.0323 1.937 0.0527
A 0.1066 0.0806 1.322 0.1860
B 0.0320 0.0810 0.395 0.6929
C 0.1510*** 0.0839 1.799 0.0720
D 0.0781 0.0804 0.971 0.3314
TEN 0.0342 0.0247 1.381 0.1674
TURN 0.0007** 0.0001 5.241 0.0000
DISTR 0.1696** 0.0222 7.651 0.0000
D96 0.0172 0.0633 0.272 0.7853
D97 0.1263 0.0958 1.318 0.1874
D98 0.1456* 0.0632 2.303 0.0213
D99 0.0078 0.0557 0.140 0.8887
D00 0.0108 0.1021 0.105 0.9160
TERR 0.0144 0.0262 0.550 0.5823
SEMID 0.0455*** 0.0250 1.825 0.0680
DETACH 0.1319** 0.0307 4.301 0.0000
VP 0.0059 0.0330 0.178 0.8584
DISTCENT 0.0417*** 0.0241 1.729 0.0838
DISTEAST 0.0177 0.0211 0.838 0.4021
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at mean values.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
The results also show that semi-detached and detached houses have a lower
probability of sale. This could be attributed to the higher prices of these properties
as well, as greater atypicality associated with larger properties. Viewed differently,
the empirical evidence shows that more homogenous properties (apartments and
condominiums) are more likely to be auctioned, a result consistent with the
prediction in Mayer (1998). Properties in the central region have a higher
probability of being sold relative to those in other regions, though only weakly
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Level of reserve price (LRP) is positive but not signiﬁcant. The positive coefﬁcient
means that the larger the difference between the market value and the opening bidFactors Influencing Auction Outcomes  187
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Exhibit 5  Marginal Effects for Auction Houses and State of the Market
Variables Coeff. Std. Error
A  1, other AH  0 0.1140*** .0884
B  1, other AH  0 0.0373*** .0953
C  1, other AH  0 0.1329 .0868
D  1, other AH  0 0.0582 .0628
SOM  0 0.0416* .0208
SOM  1 0.0877*** .0465
Notes:
AH  Auction Houses
SOM  State of the Market
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
(implying a lower reserve price relative to market value), the higher the likelihood
of a successful auction. The tenure status of the property (TEN) and vacant
possession (VP) are not signiﬁcantly associated with the probability of success,
although the signs are in the expected direction. One possible explanation is that
tenure and possession differences may be completely captured in prices paid.
An LM test for heteroscedasticity was conducted by conditioning the error term
on property characteristics (TYPE, TEN and VP). No heteroscedasticity was
detected.
Marginal Effects
Exhibit 4 shows the marginal effects of changes in the level of the explanatory
variables. It shows the marginal effects of all variable evaluated at their means
(with standard errors and signiﬁcance levels). The probability of a sale increases
marginally for every unit change in the level of reserve price when evaluated at
the mean LRP. In contrast, the probability of a sale increases by 0.07% for every
unit change in turnout, evaluated at the mean turnout of 190. Given the substantial
variation in turnout (minimum of 30, maximum of 450), the result strongly
supports the idea that turnout is critical to success.
Because the auction house variables (A, B, C and D) are dummy variables, the
marginal effects reported in Exhibit 4 are not meaningful. To better evaluate the
effect of the auction house on the probability of sale, the marginal effects were
recomputed for each auction house separately by assigning a value of 1 to the
auction house of interest and zero to the rest. The results are reported in Exhibit188  Ong, Lusht and Mak
5. It is clear that auction houses A and C have the higher marginal impact. A
property that is auctioned by auction house C has more than a 13% greater chance
of being sold than if the property is not with house C. The next highest marginal
effect is 11% for auction house A. The marginal effects for auction houses B and
D are again insigniﬁcant.
Exhibit 5 also shows the marginal effect of the state of market (SOM). When the
property market goes through two consecutive quarters of negative growth, the
probability of a sale drops by about 50%. Further analysis (results available on
request) show that the marginal effects for turnout and distress properties across
different states of the market do differ (turnout: 0.097 for SOM  1 compared to
0.046 for SOM  0; distress: 0.238 for SOM  1 compared to 0.113 for SOM 
0) though both variables are still highly signiﬁcant. In contrast, the marginal
effects for LRP remain insigniﬁcant for both states of the market.
 Conclusion
This paper extends prior work on the probability of sale at auction by using a
much richer set of explanatory variables. The ﬁndings indicate that bidder turnout
and market conditions matter, as does the choice of auctioning agent. The ﬁndings
also indicate that distress properties are more likely to sell, and a sale is more
likely in markets not in decline.
This study is relevant for banks that foreclose properties, as most foreclosures
occur when the real estate market is not performing well. The immediate
implication is that the chances of selling a property successfully in an auction
under poor market conditions are rather low. Hence banks or sellers should bear
in mind that the previous empirical evidence on the size of auction discounts
should be conditioned on a positive outcome or sale at the auction. In other words,
the expected sum recoverable for a distressed property depends not only on the
expected selling price at the auction, but also on the probability of an auction
sale.
Finally, the marginal effect analysis detailed here demonstrates that bidder
turnout—as an indicator of market interest—is also an important determinant of
a positive auction outcome.
 Endnotes
1 Auctions are often announced well in advance through the press and interested parties
are invited to inspect the properties. Typically, an auction session would comprise of at
least half a dozen properties, depending on the auction house conducting the auction.
2 SISV records and tracks all private property transactions in Singapore.
3 Another measure of success would be whether the property not sold at auction was
subsequently sold through private negotiations. This question is addressed in another
paper in progress.Factors Influencing Auction Outcomes  189
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4 A distress sale is deﬁned as an auction put up by a ﬁnancial institution that has foreclosed
on the property. We are unable to identify properties put up for auction by owners who
are ﬁnancially distressed.
5 Such a proxy assumes a rational seller who is willing to accept the current market price
that is index-adjusted. This assumption may be violated in practice. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
6 The opening bid was not used as the reserve price (as in DeBoer, et al., 1992) as it is
not uncommon to see properties receiving bids above the opening bid to be withdrawn
from the auctions. There were 275 observations where the property was withdrawn even
when the last bid, exceeding the opening bid, was submitted.
7 If the market value is lower than the opening bid, LRP is deﬁned as zero. This affects
less than 10% of the data. By doing this, a truncation error is introduced, but negative
LRP is not very meaningful in any case (i.e., a negative LRP means that the reserve
price is higher than the estimated market value or that the estimated market price is
inaccurate). As a robustness check, the results are qualitatively unchanged when LRP is
not truncated at zero.
8 The RPI was also used to proxy for SOM, and similar results were obtained.
Unemployment rate is not used as a proxy for the state of the market as it normally
lags the property market.
9 The big four auction houses are labeled A through D in this paper representing Colliers
Jardine, DTZ Debenham Tie Leung, Knight Frank and Jones Lang LaSalle (not in
corresponding order).
10 Properties in perpetuity and with 999 year leases are generally considered freehold in
Singapore.
11 The assumptions are linear utility, homogeneous expectations and a rectangular
distribution of individual valuations.
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